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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.
Hugh and Lorraine English sued Mentor Corporation,
alleging claims based upon strict product liability, negligence,
breach of express and implied warranty, loss of consortium by
Mrs. English, and punitive damages.

Mr. English had a Mentor

inflatable penile prosthesis implanted.

The device malfunctioned

and appellants sued Mentor in the Pennsylvania Court of Common
Pleas.

Mentor removed the case to the federal district court,

which granted summary judgment in its favor, holding that
appellants' claims were preempted by the Medical Device
Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360c-360rr.
Appellants raise two issues on appeal:

(1) whether the

Medical Device Amendments of 1976 preempt their state law tort
and contract claims against the manufacturer of a Class III
medical device; and (2) whether the Amendments also preempt these
claims for a medical device cleared for marketing under the
"substantial equivalence" exception to the general rule requiring
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a full Premarket Approval process.

We will affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand the cause. I.
The Medical Device Amendments classify medical devices
as Class I, II or III devices, depending upon their potential
danger to the public.

Class III devices are the most dangerous,

the most heavily regulated, and include the prosthesis implanted
in Mr. English.

Generally with Class III devices, the

manufacturer must submit a detailed "Premarket Approval"
application to the FDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1), and obtain
Premarket Approval before they can be marketed to the public. Id.
§ 360c(a)(1)(C).
There are two exceptions to this requirement.

First,

Class III devices may receive an "Investigational Device
Exemption" (or "IDE") from the FDA, id. § 360j(g), which permits
the device to be tested on human subjects without obtaining
Premarket Approval.

Id. § 360e(a).

Second, absent formal

premarket approval, the FDA has permitted manufacturers to market
new inflatable penile implants by completing the "510(k)
procedure," which requires a demonstration that the new device is
"substantially equivalent" to other penile implants already on
the market before the passage of the MDA.1

1

21 U.S.C.

In adopting the MDA, Congress drew a distinction between devices
that were on the market before its passage (and devices
"substantially equivalent" to these devices) and devices marketed
after its passage in 1976. Congress realized that it was
impracticable to require that devices that were already on the
market be withdrawn until they obtained premarket approval from
the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e. Instead, Congress directed the
FDA to promulgate regulations to allow manufacturers of these
devices to move gradually into compliance with the MDA. Id. This
3

§360c(f)(3); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.81-807.100.

Absent such a

demonstration, a device may not be marketed until obtaining the
full premarket approval described above.
Under this 510(k) procedure, the FDA must decide
whether a new device is in fact substantially equivalent to a
device already on the market prior to 1976.

See 21 U.S.C.

authority also extended to new devices "substantially equivalent"
to devices on the market as of 1976. Id.
The FDA relied on this distinction as authorization for
its 510(k) process. Thus, the FDA has issued regulations, such
as 21 C.F.R. § 876, classifying certain preexisting devices
(including inflatable penile implants) as Class III devices, but
exempting them from immediate premarket approval (by postponing
the date the regulations become effective). The FDA also allows
substantial equivalents of these devices to be marketed before
obtaining final premarket approval--by completing the 510(k)
process. Id. at §§ 807.81-807.100. These devices, however, are
required to obtain premarket approval in the future. See 21
C.F.R. § 870.1-870.3. New devices (i.e. devices not in existence
before 1976 or substantially equivalent to such a device) must
receive premarket approval before they may be marketed. 21
U.S.C. § 360e(a); 21 C.F.R. § 870.3.
With the passage of the Safe Medical Devices Act
("SMDA") in 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, Congress explicitly
codified these 510(k) procedures. See H.Rep. No. 101-808, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6319 ("Section 4(b) [of
the SMDA] codifies the FDA's current practice regarding the use
of the 510(k) procedure for entering the market."). The current
approach is found at 26 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(3), which explicitly
allows a manufacturer of a Class III device, for which no final
regulation requiring premarket approval has been promulgated, to
market the device by complying with the FDA's 510(k) notification
process. Similarly, the SMDA codified the FDA's definition of
substantial equivalence. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A). Because
Congress in the SMDA codified FDA procedures in place at the time
the device implanted into English was approved by the FDA
pursuant to the 510(k) process, we make reference to its
provisions in determining the extent to which the FDA has
regulated the device.
4

§360c(f)(3).

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A), a device is

considered "substantially equivalent" if the device:
(i) has the same technological
characteristics as the predicate device, or
(ii)(I) has different technological
characteristics and information submitted
that the device is substantially equivalent
to the predicate device contains information,
including clinical data if deemed necessary
by the Secretary, that demonstrates that the
device is as safe and effective as a legally
marketed device, and (II) does not raise
different questions of safety and efficacy
than the predicate device.
This substantial equivalence determination therefore requires the
manufacturer to provide information to the FDA in order to ensure
that "the device is safe, effective and performs as well as or
better than the [predicate] device...."

21 C.F.R. § 807.95; see

21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 807.92.
The FDA, however, views the 510(k) exception as an
intermediate step to obtaining full premarket approval.

The FDA

will eventually require all Class III devices to obtain full
premarket approval.2

2

Congress has directed the FDA to clear up the backlog of devices
that are classified as Class III, but for which the FDA has not
issued a final regulation requiring premarket approval. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(i). Congress was concerned that the FDA was using the
510(k) process as a means to avoid having to issue premarket
approval on a wide array of devices. See H.Rep. No. 101-808,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 631720. Under § 360e(i), manufacturers of these Class III devices
will have to submit information pertaining to their performance,
including safety and effectiveness data. The FDA will then be
required promptly to re-categorize these devices as Class II
devices or finally issue regulations requiring that they obtain
premarket approval. Id.
5

Before Mr. English's prosthesis was inserted, the FDA
determined that Mentor's prosthesis was substantially equivalent
to other Class III devices marketed before the Amendments, and
allowed Mentor to market its prosthesis to the public without
Premarket Approval.

The FDA had initially granted an

Investigational Device Exemption to Mentor, permitting it to test
its prosthesis on human subjects; English, however, did not
receive a device as part of an IDE test study and thus Mentor
cannot rely on IDE regulations in support of its argument that
English's state tort claims are preempted.
II.
Appellants argue first that Congress never intended the
Amendments to preempt state law claims.

We rejected that

argument in Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); see also Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995).

The preemption

provision provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b)3 of
this section, no State or political
subdivision of a state may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other

3

Subsection (b) permits a state to apply for an exemption from
the preemption of subsection (a) for certain state laws. No such
application was made in this case, thus subsection (b) is not at
issue.
6

matter included in a requirement applicable
to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
We opined in Gile that Congress' use of the word
"requirement" in § 360k(a) adequately expresses its intent to
preempt state law claims that would impose different or
additional requirements from those under federal law.
542-43.

22 F.2d at

We held that § 360k(a) preempted state law strict

liability and negligence claims as impermissible attempts to
impose additional safety or effectiveness requirements on medical
device manufacturers.

Id. at 545.

In Michael, we held that

§ 360k(a) also preempts breach of implied warranty claims because
they too arise under state law.

46 F.3d at 1324-25.

Applying Gile and Michael, we hold that the district
court correctly adjudged appellants' strict liability,
negligence, and breach of implied warranty claims preempted by
§ 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments.

Because Gile and

Michael explain our rationale with respect to these claims, we
need not.
In Michael, we held that breach of express warranty
claims are not preempted by § 360k(a) because they are created by
the parties and not by state law.

46 F.3d at 1325-26; see also

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., -- U.S. --, 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2622 (1992) ("[R]equirements imposed by an express warranty are
not 'imposed under state law,' but rather imposed by the
warrantor.").

Again, we are satisfied that our opinion in

7

Michael fully sets forth our analysis.

We will reverse the

district court's summary judgment on this claim.
The remaining claims are for loss of consortium by Mrs.
English and punitive damages.

We will uphold summary judgment

with respect to the latter, inasmuch as the Pennsylvania courts
have held that, absent fraud, punitive damages cannot be awarded
for a breach of warranty.

See e.g., AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v.

Atlantic Richfield, 526 Pa. 110, 584 A.2d 915, 927 (1992).
We have found no Pennsylvania case, however, deciding
whether a loss of consortium award can be premised upon a breach
of warranty.

Pennsylvania has made clear that loss of consortium

cannot be based on pure breach of contract.

E.g., Thorsen v.

Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa. Super. 135, 476 A.2d 928, 932
(1984).

Other courts, however, have looked to the substance of

the breach of warranty claim in deciding whether it will support
a loss of consortium award.

See, e.g., Scarzella v. Saxon, 436

A.2d 358, 363 (D.C. App. 1981) (allowing loss of consortium
premised upon breach of warranty and citing W. Prosser, Law of
Torts § 95, at 635 (4th ed. 1971) for the proposition that
warranty actions have historically sounded in tort as well as
contract); Fernandez v. Union Bookbinding Co., Inc., 400 Mass.
27, 507 N.E.2d 728, 735 (1987) (same); Klein v. Sears, Roebuck
and & Co., 92 Md. App. 477, 608 A.2d 1276, 1284, cert. denied,
328 Md. 447, 614 A.2d 973 (1992) (same); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 100-102 (1960) (same).
Appellants' breach of express warranty claim seeks
damages for personal injuries, which are recoverable in
8

Pennsylvania as consequential damages for breach of warranty.
Pa.C.S.A. § 2715(b)(2).
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Given the substance of appellants'

warranty claim and that "a consortium claim is inextricably
intertwined with the underlying action for personal injury...[,]"
Novelli v. Johns-Manville Corp., 395 Pa. Super. 144, 576 A.2d
1085, 1088 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45
(1991), we think the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit Mrs.
English to maintain her loss of consortium claim.
Finally, appellants argue that the Amendments do not
preempt their claim that Mentor failed to comply with FDA
requirements in the design and manufacture of the device.

The

district court rejected this argument because appellants did not
properly allege that Mentor failed to comply with FDA regulations
concerning the manufacturing process.

Appellants point to no

evidence that would support or create an issue of fact with
respect to such a claim, even if properly alleged.
error in the district court's determination.

We find no

See also Mendes v.

Medtronic, 18 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider
the same argument where plaintiff's complaint contained no
allegations of manufacturer's failure to comply with FDA
requirements).
III.
The second issue raised by appellants is whether
§ 360k(a) preemption also applies to a Class III medical device
without Premarket Approval, but cleared for marketing by a
"substantial equivalence" determination.

To reiterate, a

manufacturer can bypass the full-blown Premarket Approval process
9

if the FDA determines that the device is substantially equivalent
to devices on the market before the Amendment became effective in
1976.

21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1); see discussion supra part II.
FDA regulations require that a manufacturer seeking a

substantial equivalence determination submit a 510(k) Premarket
Notification containing "an adequate summary of any information
respecting [the] safety and effectiveness [of the device] or
state that such information will be made available upon request
by any person."

21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(3)(A).

The actual summary

regarding the safety and effectiveness of the device must contain
"detailed information regarding data concerning adverse health
effects and shall be made available to the public by the [FDA]
within 30 days of the issuance of a determination that such
device is substantially equivalent to another device."

Id.

§360c(i)(3)(B).
Moreover, the FDA regulates both the format and content
of a 510(k) Notification.
other things:

The Notification must include, among

any action taken by the manufacturer to comply

with the Amendment's requirements for performance standards;
proposed labels, labeling, and advertisements sufficient to
describe the device, its intended use, and the directions for its
use; where applicable, photos or engineering drawings of the
device; a statement that the device is similar to and/or
different from other products of comparable type, accompanied by
data to support the statement that may include an identification
of similar products, materials, design considerations, and a
description of the operational principles of the device; and any
10

additional information requested by the FDA that is necessary for
it to make a finding of substantial equivalency.

21 C.F.R.

§807.87.
In addition to the requirements pertaining specifically
to substantially equivalent devices, the devices are also subject
to the FDA's "General Controls," which include labeling
requirements and good manufacturing practices.
at 14 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360i, 360j).

Mendes, 18 F.3d

The parallel FDA

regulations on labeling govern the content and appearance of
prescription medical device labels.
801.109.

21 C.F.R. §§ 801.1, 801.15,

As the Mendes court noted, these regulations exempt

such devices from the requirement that there be directions to a
layperson on how to use the product safely, if the package
describes, inter alia, "any relevant hazards, contraindications,
side effects, and precautions" for the prescribing physician. Id.
at 18 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 801.109).

Furthermore, the FDA has

promulgated extensive regulations interpreting the Amendment's
good manufacturing practices requirements.

21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-

820.198.
Only a handful of federal courts have considered
whether the 510(k) process is a "requirement" that preempts state
law tort claims under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
hold that it is a requirement.

The majority of them

For example, in Mendes, supra,

the court held that a FDA determination of substantial
equivalence carries with it sufficient federal requirements
relating to safety and effectiveness to preempt state tort
claims.

Accord Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. S-9311

1072, 1994 WL 591534 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 1994); Bollier v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. H-92-2439, 1993 WL 734843 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
28, 1993); Rutland v. Mentor Corp., No. 20235, 1994 WL 454741
(Miss. Cir. Feb. 23, 1994).
With respect to Mentor's penile implants, the Rutland
court stated:
The application procedure under 510(k)
includes extensive qualification criteria
based upon clinical studies, drawings and
procedures in the manufacture of the device,
proposed labelings and warnings, extensive
product sterility information and documentation, a comparison to other devices on the
market and safety and effectiveness status
based upon ten (10) years of another similar
device. Mentor not only complied with the
510(k) requirements, it continues to comply
with post-510(k) requirements imposed by law.
Id. at *3.
Among the few cases suggesting that the 510(k) process
does not invoke preemption is Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc.,
74 Haw. 1, 837 P.2d 1273 (1992) (involving pacemaker).

Larsen

held that the 510(k) process does not preempt state law claims
because it does not constitute FDA approval of a device.
1282.

Id. at

The court cited 21 C.F.R. § 807.97, which states that an

FDA determination of substantial equivalence "does not in any way
denote official approval of the device.

Any representation that

creates an impression of official approval of a device because of
complying with the [510(k) Notification] regulations is
misleading and constitutes misbranding."

Id.

Nevertheless, we agree with the district court's wellreasoned rationale that the Amendment's preemption provision is
12

triggered not by FDA approval of a device's safety and
effectiveness, but by federal requirements relating to a device's
safety and effectiveness.

See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).

Those

regulations include the 510(k) process with which a manufacturer
must comply to obtain a determination of substantial equivalence.
We are satisfied that this process is sufficiently rigorous to
constitute a "requirement...relating to the safety or
effectiveness" of Class III medical devices, pursuant to
§360k(a).
Implicitly conceding that the FDA regulations discussed
above do establish safety requirements, English nevertheless
maintains that only regulations specifically covering inflatable
penile prostheses have preemptive effect.

In support of this

argument, English asserts that the FDA has determined that
preemption only applies when:
[T]he [FDA] has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a
particular device under the act, thereby
making any existing divergent State or local
requirements applicable to the device
different from, or in addition to, the
specific [FDA] requirements. There are other
State or local requirements that affect
devices that are not preempted by section
[360k(a)] of the act because they are "not
requirements applicable to a device" within
the meaning of section [360k(a)] of the act.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (emphasis added).

Indeed, two district

courts have followed this logic and ruled that preemption occurs
only when there are specific, but not general, regulations
pertaining to a device.

Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp.
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948, 951-53 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F.
Supp. 905, 906 (D. Colo. 1994).
We find this argument unconvincing.

First, English

attempts to read the phrase "other specific requirements
applicable to a particular device" out of the statute.

This

phrase suggests that a general regulation that is binding on a
particular device has preemptive effect.

See Hodgon v. Mentor

Corp., No. 92-1429, slip. op. at 5 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 1994)
(finding premarket approval regulations are "specific
requirements" within meaning of § 808.1(d)); Tucker v. Collagen
Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3101, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16,
1994) (rejecting narrow reading of § 808.1(d)).

Indeed, other

circuits have relied on FDA regulations generally applicable to
Class III devices in order to find preemption.

See Mendes, 18

F.3d at 17-18 (good manufacturing practice and labeling
requirements); Stamps v. Collagen Corp, 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 n.5
(5th Cir.) (good manufacturing practice requirements), cert.
denied, -- U.S. --, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen Corp.,
983 F.2d 1130, 1131 (1st Cir.) (premarket approval application
requirements), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 84 (1993).
Second, even assuming that the FDA's regulations should
be interpreted as English suggests, we believe no deference is
owed to that interpretation because it conflicts with the text of
the statute.

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778,
2781 (1984).

Here, Congress directed that state requirements are

preempted "which are different from, or in addition to, any
14

requirement under [the FDCA]."
added).

21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (emphasis

Thus, the mere fact that the FDA has promulgated

regulations affecting groups of devices, rather than a specific
type of device, should not alter whether or not there is
preemption.

See

Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 49

(D. Mass. 1994) (rejecting FDA's interpretation of preemption
provision as contrary to statute); Ministry of Health, Province
of Ontario, Canada v. Shirley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (same); see also Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421 n.2
(interpreting § 360k(a) and § 808.1(d) as announcing "essentially
the same test"); King, 983 F.2d at 1130 (ruling that § 360k(a)
provides "maximum protection and express preemption....").
Finally, since promulgating § 808.1(d), the FDA has
issued an interpretation of § 808.1(d) contradictory to the one
advanced by English.

The FDA has stated:

"[P]reemption is not

restricted to State requirements that directly conflict with
Federal law, but rather extends to requirements that are
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to
the device under the act."
(emphasis added).

45 Fed. Reg. 67,326, 67,328 (1980)

Thus, we conclude that the FDA's labeling and

good manufacturing practices regulations establish requirements
within the meaning of § 360k(a).
IV.
In conclusion, based on our decisions in Gile and
Michael, we hold that appellants' strict product liability,
negligence and breach of implied warranty claims are preempted by
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
15

Furthermore, we hold that

preemption applies even where, as here, a Class III medical
device is cleared for marketing under the "substantial
equivalence" exception to the MDA Premarket Approval process.
hold, nonetheless, that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment in Mentor's favor on appellants' breach of
express warranty claim.

Under our holding in Michael, such a

claim is not preempted by the MDA.4

We will reverse and remand

the cause for further proceedings on this claim.

4

For the reasons stated, we also remand Mrs. English's loss of
consortium claim; however, we affirm summary judgment on
appellants' claim for punitive damages.
16

We

